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1. Introduction 
 In this paper, we extend Braid (2008) to capture the sensitivity of equilibrium 
locations of downstream firms, selling different varieties of a product, to the vertical 
structure of an industry when spatial moves are sequential. Braid (2008) showed that the 
equilibrium locations of two firms are partially centralized to the socially optimal extent 
if there is spatial price discrimination, and if each firm has two out of three products, or 
else one variety of a differentiated product with some consumers indifferent between 
varieties. In what follows, we demonstrate the effect of sequential moves by downstream 
firms engaged in spatial competition in a vertically related industry where no firm can 
produce all the varieties that consumers demand. 
2. Model and Propositions 
Consider a vertically related industry with one upstream firm ( M ) producing an 
intermediate good and selling this good to 2 downstream firms ( jR : 2,1i ) who 
transform (on a one-to-one basis) the intermediate good into differentiated final goods 
and sell to consumers distributed uniformly with unit density on a uni-dimensional 
(linear) market interval with support [0, 1]. The downstream firms R1 and R2 are located 
at x and y, respectively, on this interval. R1 sells products U and W, and R2 sells products 
V and W:  a fraction c of consumers want to buy product U; a fraction c of consumers 
want to buy product V; and a fraction b of consumers want to buy product W.1  
Transportation costs are td, where t is a constant and d is the distance shipped. There is a 
maximum reservation price (k) consumers are willing to pay which is sufficiently large so 
that it comes into play only for product varieties where there is no competition between 
the two firms. The game is played with perfect monitoring i.e. all past actions become 
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common knowledge at the end of each stage. The following figure summarizes the 
sequence in which the game is played. 
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 Figure 1. Sequence of Events 
 But for the sequential choice of location by R1 and R2, the structure of the game is 
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Solving the first order conditions for R1’s profit-maximization and plugging this solution 
into (2), we obtain 
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This leads to our first proposition. 
Proposition I. Absent the possibility of any merger, the Nash equilibrium locations of the 
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 Figure 2. Vertical Merger with Downstream Leader 
 
This leads to our next two propositions. 
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 Figure 3. Vertical Merger with Downstream Follower 
 
This leads to our final propositions. 
Proposition 4. If the downstream follower merges upstream, the Nash equilibrium 
locations of the two downstream firms, engaged in spatial competition in a vertically 
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 It is worth noting (ref. figures 2  and 3) that when the downstream firms are allowed 
to move sequentially, in contrast3 with Beladi et al. (2008), the merged firm 
(notwithstanding the order of its move) locates farther away from the social optimum 
than does the firm outside the merger. Also, notwithstanding the vertical structure of the 
industry, the equilibrium locations of the sequentially moving downstream firms no 
longer gravitate toward Braid’s (2008) partially social optimum 

  R
2
1  even if the 
upstream monopoly is broken up. 
3. Conclusion 
 
 In this paper we have taken a step forward along the path of efforts that continue to 
capture the implications of the vertical structure4 of an industry for the location of 
downstream firms that move sequentially. We have shown that, with sequentially moving 
downstream firms that can not produce all the varieties that consumers demand, the 
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merged firm (notwithstanding the order of its move) will locate farther away from the 
social optimum than will the firm outside the merger.5 A couple of interesting extensions, 
we are currently working on, include a) allowing incomplete information when each 
downstream firm’s unit cost is unknown6 to its rival and b) endogenizing the sequence of 
moves by adding a prior stage where each firm chooses when to pick its location.. 
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1 If firms cannot price discriminate at each location between the different types of consumers who find its own variety 
desirable, then it might be possible to assume mixed price strategies, but unlike Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), who have 
a single mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in mill prices for any given set of firm locations, there would be a different 
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in delivered prices at each consumer location for any given set of firm locations. We 
maintain that there is spatial price discrimination for product W of the sort first examined in Hoover (1937) and Lerner 
and Singer (1937), in which there is a Nash equilibrium in delivered price schedules.   
2 Beladi et al. (2008) showed that in a vertically related industry, with an upstream monopoly, the downstream firms 
will not choose the socially optimal location. A vertical merger will exacerbate the distance of the downstream firms 
from the socially optimal location: the firm outside the merger will deviate more than the firm that is part of the merger 
when the firms move simultaneously. 
3 Analogous to Beladi et al. (2008), notwithstanding the vertical structure of the market, the downstream firms gravitate 
toward the social optimum if  0b  (i.e. when, in the absence of any demand for W, the downstream firms are reduced 
to spatial-price-discriminating monopolists choosing uniform delivered prices). This replicates the equilibrium one 
would expect, á la Hotelling (1929), in the market for a homogeneous product where the (mill) prices of the two firms 
are exogenous and equal, and consumers pay travel costs. 
4 See Lafontaine and Slade (2007) for an insightful review of the contributions relevant to the related literature. 
5 Our results are likely to have important implications for a firm’s inter-temporal choice of entry mode. See, for 
instance, Haller (2009), Lahiri (2009), Kurata et al. (2009) and Raff et al. (2009).  
6 See Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2009) for an elegant model that compares across equilibria resulting from 
sequential and simultaneous moves when firms’ unit costs are private information. 
